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DoMEsTIc RELATIONS
of the bigamous marriage.26 In 1961 the statute was amended to in-
dude within the definition of a bigamist anyone who, having a living
spouse, cohabits within the state with another spouse' If the defendant
in the above case has not left this state, but is still living with a second
spouse, he is criminally liable.
Rape - Intoxication as a Defense
In State v. French8 the defendant was convicted of rape. The court
of appeals reversed because the trial court had instructed the jury that
the defendant's incapacity to commit rape by reason of intoxication must
be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. The
Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The court held that, since
there is a presumption that anyone over fourteen years has the capacity
to commit rape, the defendant must affirmatively rebut it. The court
pointed out the similarity between physical incapacity due to intoxication
and mental incapacity due to insanity. Both must be proven by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence to be valid defenses.
GERALD S. GOLD
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
The past year was of average interest to the observer of domestic re-
lations litigation. There were no major changes in doctrine, and the
Ohio Supreme Court continued to be reluctant to accept many of the
cases in this area, apparently for fear of becoming a glorified divorce
court. There were a number of interesting court of appeals cases, but
most reported opinions represent the application of established and often
unsatisfactory doctrine to diverse factual patterns. As to the volume of
cases, there were forty-nine reported cases during the period covered by
this survey.' This is about average. In the six years of this writer's re-
porting on Ohio domestic relations law the number of reported cases has
run from a low of forty in 1959 to a high of sixty-five in 1956. More
than any other area, except possibly automobile accidents, the reported
cases in domestic relations represent the visible portion of a very large
iceberg. The best estimate is that approximately 30,000 domestic rela-
26. 33 Ohio Laws 33 (1953).
27. OHio REv. CODE § 2905A3 (Supp. 1961).
28. 171 Ohio St. 501, 172 N.E.2d 613 (1961).
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tions cases were heard by the Ohio courts during the year and even this
case load does not include the numerous motions to modify or enforce ali-
mony and custody decrees, many of which consume more of the court's
time and efforts than the original divorce.
INTERSTATE ASPECTS
There were two cases which involved jurisdiction and choice of law
where an Ohio court was asked to determine the rights of a child whose
parents were residents of another state.
In Howells v. Limbeck2 the illegitimate son of a deceased Florida resi-
dent sought to inherit land located in Ohio which belonged to the father.
Under both Ohio and Florida law an illegitimate child cannot inherit
from his father. In Florida, acknowledgement of paternity in writing is
sufficient to legitimate, but such an acknowledgement is not enough in
Ohio, where marriage is also required. In this case the father, while a
resident of Florida, acknowledged paternity in writing. After the father's
death, the son filed a declaratory judgment action in Florida and on the
basis of the acknowledgement, the Florida court decreed that he was
legitimate. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the right of a child to
inherit Ohio land is determined by Ohio law, but his status as a child
depends on the law of his parent's domicile. Specifically, where the basis
for legitimation is an acknowledgement by the father, the legal effect of
the acknowledgement is determined by the law of his domicile at the time
of the act. The supreme court concluded that the Florida decree was en-
titled to full faith and credit and that the child could inherit. As Justice
Taft's concurring opinion points out, the decision on choice of law was
correct, and consistent with the Restatement of Conflict of Laws.3 How-
ever, it is not correct to decide the case on the basis of recognition of the
Florida decree. The Florida case was a declaratory judgment action, the
Ohio claimants were not parties to it, and should not be bound by it.
The second case in this area upheld the jurisdiction of an Ohio juven-
ile court to determine custody of a child who lived with his aunt and
uncle in Ohio.4 At least one of the child's parents was a resident of Indi-
ana, and an action for divorce was pending in an Indiana court. The
decision was dearly consistent with the case of Fore v. Toth5 where the
1. The cases covered by the survey are those reported in the North Eastern Reporter during
the calendar year 1961, from 170 N.E.2d 309 to 178 N.E.2d 192.
2. 172 Ohio St. 297, 175 N.E.2d 517 (1961). See also discussion in Conflict of Laws sec-
tion, p. 446 supra.
3. RETATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICr OF LAWS §§ 137, 246 (1958).
4. In re Minton, 176 NXE.2d 252 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
5. 168 Ohio St. 363, 155 N.E.2d 194 (1958).
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supreme court held that Ohio could place a child who was present in
Ohio under guardianship, regardless of the domicile of the parents.
The Schwartz case' held that a divorce obtained by perjury in another
state was subject to collateral attack in Ohio. The decision is question-
able, as most of the cases cited in favor of non-recognition are cases where
the fraud connected with the divorce related to lack of due process or
fraud as to jurisdiction.
DIVORCE
Procedure
Legislatures have a rather bad habit of enacting statutes without
spelling out, and apparently without even considering, the appropriate
sanction which should be applied for violation of the statute. The so-
called "mandatory divorce investigation statute" is a good example. The
statute requires a social work investigation as part of every divorce case
where there are children under fourteen It is dear from the wording
of the statute that the investigation is mandatory. Past cases have held
that if the statute is not complied with, the divorce can be upset on appeal.
A recent decision holds that in a case of non-compliance the divorce
would be upset even after the time for appeal had run. The court held
that it had authority, and possibly that it was required, to vacate a divorce
decree entered in a prior term of court where no investigation was held.
There was no indication in the opinion that either party had remarried
after the defective divorce, but it is always a possibility. It would seem
that labeling a second marriage bigamous is too harsh a penalty, especial-
ly where the defect in procedure was the fault of the court, rather than of
the parties.
Grounds and Defenses
In Ginn v. Ginn,' a case of first impression, the court held that an
attempt by one spouse to have the other spouse committed to a mental
hospital is a ground for divorce, if the action was taken without probable
cause. In this case the wife acted without medical advice, and when she
had not seen her husband for over a month. The husband was released
from the hospital as not mentally ill after three days. It is possible under
the doctrine of this case, that the institution of commitment proceedings
6. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 113 Ohio App. 275, 173 N.E.2d 393 (1960). See also discussion
in Conflict of Laws section, p. 445 supra.
7. OHIO REV. CODE § 3105.08.
8. Cobb v. Cobb, 174 NE.2d 290 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
9. 175 N.E.2d 848 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
1962]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
without probable cause would be a ground for divorce even if the patient
is mentally ill in fact, and would benefit from hospitalization.
Alimony
In Bentz v. Bentz"° the supreme court settled a question which has
caused some difficulty in the lower courts - the relationship between
temporary and permanent alimony. The wife was awarded a divorce and
permanent alimony consisting of a lump sum payable in monthly install-
ments. The husband appealed, and the court of appeals ordered him to
pay a fixed sum for the expenses of the appeal, and also monthly alimony
for her support pending the appeal." After the trial court was affirmed,
the husband attempted to offset the amounts paid as temporary alimony,
but not the amounts paid for expenses, against the obligation to pay per-
manent alimony. The supreme court upheld the offset, pointing out that
if a credit were not allowed, the wife would receive double support during
the appeal, which would be unfair to the husband, as permanent alimony
was fixed at the date of divorce on the basis of the wife's needs at that
time.
Prior to 1951, if the husband divorced the wife for her misconduct,
she was not entitled to alimony. In 1951 the alimony statute was
amended so as to eliminate any reference to misconduct 2 and since then
the courts have been free to award alimony to the guilty party. Some
lower courts have continued to consider the fact of misconduct in deter-
mining the amount of alimony to be awarded. Until this year there have
been no cases on the effect, if any, which misconduct should have bn the
award of alimony. In the Esteb case' 3 the court awarded a divorce to the
husband because of the wife's misconduct, and then allowed him alimony
because of her fault. This was reversed by the court of appeals which
held that misconduct, or "aggression" (the term used in the pre-1951
statute) may not be considered at all in the determination of alimony.
The supreme court in reversing the court of appeals held that aggression
was not a controlling factor, but could be considered by the trial court
in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, as a factor in the determination
of alimony. 4
10. 171 Ohio St. 535, 173 N.E.2d 129 (1961).
11. In the Bentz case the supreme court did not comment on the fact that the court of ap-
peals ordered alimony pending appeal while the case was before the supreme court. In Roberts
v. Roberts, 177 N.E.2d 287 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961), the court of appeals held that it had
authority to order alimony pending appeal while the appeal was before it, but not while its
decision was pending in the supreme court.
12. Compare OHIO REV. CODE § 3105.18 with OHIO GEN. CODE § 8003-19.
13. Esteb v. Esteb, 175 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
14. Esteb v. Esteb, 173 Ohio St. 259 (1962).
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HUSBAND AND WIFE
Duty of Support
Under Ohio law a husband is required to support his wife, even if
they are living apart by mutual consent. One of the tools that the wife
can use to enforce this obligation is the so-called "alimony only" action.
There has been some confusion in the lower courts as to the effect of
such a decree. The court should not adjudicate permanent alimony or a
division of property, because the parties are still married and such a de-
cree might be an obstacle to reconciliation. The decree is not quite
equivalent to the "divorce from bed and board" or the "legal separation"
authorized by statute in many states, but it is substantially similar because
the time spent apart under such a decree cannot be counted as desertion
for one year in a subsequent divorce action. 5 In a recent Ohio case the
wife filed a divorce action and then amended her petition to ask for a
legal separation.'" The trial court found that she was entitled to a legal
separation, but was not entitled to alimony (apparently on the ground
that she had independent means). The court of appeals held that the
phrase "legal separation" should be deleted from the judgment, and also
pointed out that the denial of alimony might be misconstrued as absolv-
ing the husband from his duty of support. Accordingly, the decree should
be amended so as to indicate:
(1) The wife is not now entitled to alimony.
(2) The trial court will retain jurisdiction of the case so that ali-
mony can be granted in the future on a showing of changed circum-
stances.
(3) The decree should specifically provide that it does not relieve
the husband of his obligation of support.
The last provision is important to the wife because it allows her to
exercise other remedies to enforce support. She could pledge her hus-
band's credit for necessities, or, if she were pregnant, file a criminal non-
support action, without the necessity of first going back to court and ask-
ing for more alimony under the original decree.
Antenuptial Agreements
Under the Ohio statutes, an antenuptial contract is valid, but parties
cannot alter their legal relationships while they are married." There is
one way by which legal relations can be changed during marriage, and
this is the rescission of a valid antenuptial agreement. The Ohio law on
15. Condon v. Condon, 8 Ohio App. 189 (1917).
16. Cummings v. Cummings, 173 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
17. OHIO REv. CoDE §§ 3103.05-.06.
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antenuptial agreements was thoroughly reviewed in a recent probate court
opinion."8 The parties to the marriage entered into an antenuptial agree-
ment under which the husband promised to leave her $15,000 by will,
each party waived all other rights in the other's estate, and on the death of
the husband, his property should pass to his heirs as if he were unmarried.
The husband died without a will and the wife claimed the estate as
against the brother and sister of the husband. The court held:
(1) The widow's testimony that the contract was rescinded by
mutual agreement was barred by the "dead man statute," Ohio Revised
Code section 2317.03.
(2) Under Ohio Revised Code section 2131.03, the wife who tries
to avoid an antenuptial agreement must act within six months after the
appointment of an administrator. Contrary to some earlier cases, this
special statute of limitations applies even though the basis of the attack
is mutual rescission or fraud in the inducement.
(3) Although the contract provided that the husband would leave
her $15,000 by will, and he died intestate, the court construed the con-
tract as a promise to give her $15,000, either by will or by action of the
probate court. Accordingly, the contract was substantially performed by
the husband and the wife could not avoid it on the ground of breach of
contract.
(4) The brother and sister of the deceased husband do not take as
the heirs, but take as beneficiaries of a third party beneficiary contract.
Yet, while they take by contract, they are not creditors of the estate but
take as distributees through the decedent. As such, they do not rank
with general creditors over distributees in case of insolvency, and do not
have to file creditor's claims under the four month "non-claim" statute,
Ohio Revised Code section 2117.06.
Alienation of Affections
There were two interesting alienation of affection cases, neither of
which announced any new legal principles. 9 Both of these cases held
that the plaintiffs' case should go to the jury, in spite of the fact that in
each case there was some evidence that the spouses were already estranged
before the erring husband took up with the "other woman." The cases
are a good illustration of the strict Ohio rule that the defendant is liable
if her acts combine with the acts of the wayward husband to encourage
separation or discourage reconciliation. In other words, the "other
18. Cantor v. Cantor, 174 N.E.2d 304 (Ohio P. Ct. 1959).
19. Franklin v. Schreyer, 174 N.E.2d 132 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960); Wallen v. Gorman, 176
N.E.2d 262 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
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woman" who associates with a married man before his divorce becomes
final does so at her peril.
MARRMAGE
Grounds for Annulment and Divorce
Under the common-law of marriage, fraud, impotency, and bigamy are
grounds for annulment. In Ohio they are also grounds for divorce. For
many years the Ohio courts granted both annulments and divorces, de-
pending on which relief the parties requested, or on the circumstances of
the case. In 1952 the Eggleston case20 held that where the parties to a
bigamous marriage had lived together for a substantial period of time,
had children, and where one party insisted on a divorce and the other
asked for an annulment, the court was without jurisdiction to grant an an-
nulment. The court stated that where the defect in the marriage is a
ground for both divorce and annulment divorce is the exclusive remedy.
Since this .decision the lower courts have had a great deal of difficulty
with the question, and none of these cases have gone to the supreme
court which is the only court which can clear up the confusion. Some
courts have taken the Eggleston dictum literally, and held that there can
be no annulment for any of the three causes listed in the divorce statute.
Other courts have held that the supreme court decision should be limited
to its facts, and have held, (1) that annulment is proper where neither
party insists on divorce, or (2) divorce is the exclusive remedy only
where the parties have lived together for a substantial period of time. A
few courts have solved the problem by simply ignoring the Eggleston de-
cision.
There were two cases which raised the issue during the past year.
The first was a court of appeals decision which apparently ignored the
question. In Schwartz v. Schwartz"' the wife sued for annulment on the
ground of bigamy. The husband admitted the allegations of the wife's
petition and did not object to an annulment. The court granted the an-
nulment, stating that in Ohio either annulment or divorce is an appropri-
ate remedy. The court also held, without specific discussion of the
question, that the Ohio rule on choice of remedies (divorce or annul-
ment) would apply to a marriage which took place in Pennsylvania.
This decision was probably correct under accepted choice of law rules.
The Abelt case22 held to the contrary. In this case the husband sued
for annulment on the grounds of both duress and bigamy and the wife
20. Eggleston v. Eggleston, 156 Ohio St. 422, 103 NXE.2d 395 (1952).
21. 173 N.E.2d 393 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960). See also discussion in Conflict of Laws section,
p. 445 supra.
22. Abelt v. Zeman, 173 N.E.2d 907 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
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counter-claimed for divorce on the ground of bigamy. The court held
that the duress issue should be tried first and if it were proved, an an-
nulment should be granted. If it were not proved, the court should
then try the wife's suit for divorce, and if bigamy were proved, it should
grant a divorce rather than an annulment." This last decision was made
on the basis of the Eggleston case, even though the parties never co-
habited.
Common-Law Marriage
Surprisingly, there was only one case on common-law marriage. The
parties to a ceremonial marriage were divorced and the divorce decree
incorporated a division of property. The husband died three weeks after
the divorce without revoking a will which left everything to the wife.
The court held that the divorce plus the property settlement amounted
to revocation by act of law, and evidence that the parties continued to
live together after the divorce was insufficient to establish a new com-
mon-law marriage.2 4
PARENT AND CHILD
Duty of Support
The case of State v. Earich25 illustrates an effective remedy for non-
support of a child. The court held that an unemployed father is liable
for criminal non-support if he fails to apply for relief, or applies and then
fails to use his best efforts to remain qualified for relief. In this case
the defendant applied for county relief but failed to show up for a work
relief program. Sentence was suspended as long as he kept up his work
obligation to the county. Presumably, the same device could be used to
compel a husband to support his wife under the criminal non-support
statute.
26
Parents are liable for the support of their minor children, but not
their adult children. There is one exception to this rule. The statute on the
support of patients in state mental hospitals provides that the spouse, par-
23. In a subsequent opinion, the court determined that there was no duress, and that the
parties were under age at the time of the marriage, that there had been no cohabitation or
ratification, and the parties were therefore entitled to an annulment. However, the court
deferred granting the annulment until the paternity of a child born to the wife could be es-
tablished, holding that if the husband were the father, a child custody and support order
should be made part of the annulment decree. Abelt v. Zeman, 87 Ohio L. Abs. 600 (Ohio
C.P. 1961).
24. Skorapa v. Skorapa, 177 N.E.2d 310 (Ohio P. Ct. 1961).
25. 176 N.E.2d 191 (Ohio Juv. Ct. 1961).
26. OHmo REV. CODE §§ 3113.01, .03.
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ents, and children of the patient are liable to the state for his support. In
last year's survey article the Pizon case was discussed.2 ' The court of ap-
peals held that the spouse was primarily liable, and the adult children and
parents were secondarily liable. Accordingly, the children could not be
sued for support until remedies against the spouse had been exhausted.
This decision was reversed by the supreme court this year in an opinion
which held that the statute created joint and several liability.2 The su-
preme court decision has been codified in the new patient support law
which was enacted last fall.29
Adoption
Under most circumstances, the consent of the parents is required for
adoption. Under either the adoption law, or under the juvenile court
law, this consent can be dispensed with if the parent has willfully neg-
lected to support the child. As pointed out in previous survey articles,
the lower courts are inclined to find neglect on rather flimsy evidence,
and these cases are frequently reversed by the appellate courts which re-
quire that the neglect be intentional and substantial.3" The Peters case"1
is a good illustration, and as might be expected, the probate court was
reversed.
In the strict sense, the term "de facto adoption" is a misnomer. Adop-
tion is purely statutory, the statute is in derogation of the common law,
and the general rule is that all of the statutory procedures must be strictly
complied with. Occasionally the courts will relax the rules, as where the
child has lived with the adoptive parents for a substantial period and
there was some colorable attempt to adopt, the child will be permitted to
inherit from the adoptive parent. Another situation is where the adop-
tive parents try to justify their failure to support the child on the basis
of a technical defect in the adoption. Although this second situation is
really a case of estoppel, it is sometimes referred to as "de facto adoption."
A court of appeals decision points out that the de facto adoption is limited
to these two situations, and an informal adoption by a stepfather is not
effective to relieve the natural father of his obligation to support the
child.32
27. See Ross, Survey of Ohio Law - Domestic Relations, 12 WEST. RES. L. REv. 513
(1961); State v. Pizon, 168 N.E.2d 631 (Ohio C.P. 1959), aff'd, Ohio Ct. App. (unre-
ported).
28. State v. Pizon, 172 Ohio St. 352, 176 N.E.2d 595 (1961).
29. OmO REV. CODE § 5121.06.
30. See Ross, Survey of Ohio Law - Domestic Relations, 9 WEST. REs. L. REv. 322 (1958).
31. In re Adoption of Peters, 177 N.E.2d 541 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
32. Logan v. Logan, 170 N.E.2d 922 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
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Illegitimacy
There were seven reported cases on illegitimacy, which is not surpris-
ing, considering that there were 1,300 paternity cases filed during the
year in one county alone." Most of the cases represented problems which
crop up almost every year. Thus there were two cases that held that a
paternity action is essentially civil, in spite of the quasi-criminal proce-
dure used, so the defendant can be compelled to testify. 4 There were
also two cases which held that a determination of paternity in a paternity
action is not a necessary prerequisite for a criminal action for non-support
of an illegitimate child,35 or for a civil action for support under the Uni-
form Support Act. 6 There was another case on the meaning of the am-
biguous phrase in the paternity statute which states that the action can
be brought by an unmarried woman. One case has held that if the
plaintiff is unmarried at the birth of the child the statute does not bar the
action. 8  However, in Beam v. Ray 9 a court of appeals followed the
weight of lower court authority and held that marriage after the birth
and before filing the action is a bar.
Presumption of Legitimacy
One of the strongest presumptions known to the law is the presump-
tion that the child of a married woman is the child of her husband. In
both Langel v. Langel4° and Koch v. Miller4 the presumption was suc-
cessfully rebutted. Prior to 1944 the courts held that the presumption
of legitimacy could only be overcome where there was dear and convinc-
ing proof that it was impossible for the husband to have fathered the
child.4  In the case of State ex. rel Walker v. Clark43 the supreme court
modified the rule so that the presumption can be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence that there was in fact no sexual intercourse between
husband and wife at the time of conception. The next logical step, which
has not yet been taken, is to allow the presumption to be rebutted on
clear and convincing evidence that the husband is not the father, even
33. See Taylor v. Mosley, 178 N.E.2d 55, 64 (Ohio Juv. Ct. 1961), which gives this figure
for paternity cases in Cuyahoga County in 1961.
34. State v. Mooney, 171 N.E.2d 918 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961); Taylor v. Mosley, 178 N.E.2d
55 (Ohio Juv. Ct. 1961).
35. State v. Medley, 172 N.E.2d 143 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
36. In re Duncan, 172 N.E.2d 478 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
37. Beam v. Ray, 111 Ohio App. 341, 170 N.E.2d 844 (1960).
38. Kirkbride v. Eschbaugh, 147 N.E.2d 676 (Ohio Juv. Ct. 1957).
39. 111 Ohio App. 31, 170 N.E.2d 844 (1960).
40. 175 N.B.2d 312 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
41. 178 N.E.2d 186 (Ohio P. Ct. 1961).
42. Powell v. State ex rel Fowler, 84 Ohio St. 165, 95 N.E. 660 (1911).
43. 144 Ohio St. 305, 58 N.E.2d 773 (1944).
[Vol. 13:3.
